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Antitrust Implications of Casino Mergers:
The Gamble of Defining a Relevant Market
MELISSA FALLON*

INTRODUCTION

Recent merger announcements have turned the Las Vegas Strip into
the focus of antitrust speculation. When Harrah's announced its
proposed acquisition of Caesars Entertainment on the heels of the MGM
Mirage-Mandalay merger announcement in 2004, industry insiders began
wondering how the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was going to
handle the antitrust repercussions.' Speculation swarmed that the
Harrah's deal was intended to disrupt the MGM Mirage-Mandalay
merger by increasing regulatory scrutiny, and that the FTC could halt
both deals.' The FTC made a second request for information from the
casino giants demonstrating concerns about potential anticompetitive
effects and increased market concentration.3 Both deals were ultimately
approved, after the sale of numerous casino properties.
Before the FTC decided to approve the deals, the agency had the
challenge of defining the relevant market. Given that judicial outcomes
* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2006; B.A., Pepperdine
University. I would like to give thanks to Professor McCall for his encouragement through the writing
process and special thanks to my family who have supported me through the the years.
i. Rod Smith, The MGM Mirage-Mandalayand Harrah's-CaesarsMergers Create Questions No
One Can Answer, HOTEL ONLINE, July I8, 2004 [hereinafter Smith, The MGM], http://hotel-

online.com/News/PR2oo4_3rd/Julo4-MergerScrutiny.html. Antitrust laws are enforced by two
federally created enforcement agencies, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), as well as private action by individuals who have been harmed by antitrust
violations. Typically, the DOJ has specialized in the software and telecommunications industries while
the FTC specializes in more traditional industries. The agencies must agree about who will handle a
specific merger, and it is likely that a tacit agreement exists that the FTC will handle casino mergers.
Pamela McClintock, A T& T-Comcast May Go to the Justice, DAILY VARIETY, Feb. 25, 2002, at 26.
2. Rod Smith, The MGM Mirage-Mandalayand Harrah's-CaesarsMergers Create Questions No
One Can Answer, HOTEL

ONLINE,

July

18,

2004 [hereinafter

Smith, The MGM], http://hotel-

online.com/News/PR2oo4_3rd/Julo4.MergerScrutiny.html.
3. Rod Smith, FTC Places Merger on Hold, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., Nov. 8, 2003, at Di [hereinafter
Smith, FTC Places]. A second request is issued under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act and the effect of the
request is to extend the waiting period for consummation of the merger until thirty days after both
parties have provided the requested information. See Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2005).
The waiting period can be voluntarily extended by the parties or terminated earlier by the FTC or
DOJ. Id.
[235]

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[V01. 57:235

in merger cases invariably turn on the market share held by the merging
entities, which in turn are established by the definition of the relevant
market,4 the FTC had incentive to get the definition right before
questioning the deals. However, definition of the "market" in which a
given casino competes is not an easy task. There are an array of basic
products to examine, such as hotel rooms, slots, table games,
entertainment, food and beverage, as well as potential submarkets of
unique consumers (e.g., high stakes table gamblers) and geographic
markets that could be internationally broad or confined as narrowly as
the Las Vegas Strip and other regional markets. Case law provides
frustratingly inconclusive guidance in defining service product markets
and for geographic markets generally.
This Note will examine the unique challenges that the FTC and the
courts face in defining a relevant market in casino industry mergers.
Part I will explain how and why defining a relevant market is vital in
horizontal merger analysis;5 Part II examines the history of interaction
between the FFC and the casino industry; Part III addresses the
definition of relevant product market for services and delineating a
relevant geographic market; and Part IV suggests what the FTC should
have considered in defining the relevant market for the current round of
mergers.
I.
A.

DEFINING THE RELEVANT MARKET

CASE LAW DEFINING THE RELEVANT MARKET

Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits any merger that "may"
substantially lessen competition,6 and the government has implemented a
pre-merger notification program designed to stop a merger before
antitrust problems develop.7 Under the rebuttable presumption of
anticompetitive effect based on market share announced in United States
v. Philadelphia National Bank, courts have analyzed the potential
anticompetitive effects of a horizontal merger by focusing on the relevant
market. The Court in Philadelphia National Bank found that
4. See generally United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001); United States v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 63 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1o98
(N.D. Cal. 2004). "This is because under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, enforcement of the anti-merger
provisions proceeds from the premise that when a small group of firms occupies a large share of the
relevant market, the firms can more easily coordinate sales policies in order to raise prices above
competitive levels." FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 45 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
5. A merger is horizontal when it involves the merger of two firms that sell the same products in
the same geographic markets, i.e. the merging firms were competitors prior to the consummation of a
merger. As a result of the merger, the market will have one less competitor and the post-merger firm
will have a larger market share than it did prior to the merger.
6. 15 U.S.C. § i8 (2005).
7. See Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 15 U.S.C. § i8a.
8. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362-63 (1963); see also United
States v. Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962); United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
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anticompetitive effects could be presumed if the merger "produces a firm
controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market, and results
in a significant increase in the concentration of firms in that market."9
B.

THE MERGER GUIDELINES' APPROACH TO DEFINING THE
RELEVANT MARKET

The U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission
Horizontal Merger Guidelines ° create a framework binding on the FTC
and the Department of Justice (DOJ) for determining how a merger is
analyzed, and also guide the agencies in exercising prosecutorial
discretion." The Merger Guidelines depart somewhat from the
Philadelphia National Bank presumption by focusing on market-wide
concentration of market power rather than the aggregate of the leading
firms in the market." Market shares can be used as a generally
satisfactory proxy for market power; thus, high market power can be
inferred from high market shares and, from high market power,
anticompetitive effects can be presumed.'3 In order to calculate market
share, the relevant market must be defined and both the firms competing
in the market and those likely to enter the market within one year must
be identified. "Following these steps, the Guidelines calculate the market
share of each [of these] participant[s], followed by [application of] the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) concentration measurement for the
market as a whole."' 4 The Merger Guidelines have developed an
approach for delineating a relevant market by primarily focusing on
demand substitution in both a product and geographical market.'
The government posits a provisional product and a provisional
geographic market, yielding a "relevant market" in which a firm
competes. Taking the provisional product market, the government
hypothesizes a small but significant and nontransitory increase in price
(SSNIP), usually around five percent." If the firm could profitably
351 U.S. 377, 38o,391-93 (1956).

8,

9. PhiladelphiaNat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 363.
to. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (rev. ed. Apr.
1997), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz book/toc'htmi [hereinafter

MERGER GUIDELINES].
I I. ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS, AND PROBLEMS IN

COMPETITION POLICY 455 (2002).

See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note To, at I.O.
13. GAVIL, supra note II, at 461. Demand substitution examines which products are substitutes in
12.

the eyes of consumers. Id.
14. United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d io98, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 2004); MERGER
GUIDELINES, supra note io, at 1.3.
15. See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note To, at i.o. Supply substitution is also taken into account
after the firms in the market have been identified to determine those producers who would likely
switch production to this market to take advantage of higher profits and if consumers would be
receptive to these new producers. Id.
i6. Id. at i.Ii.
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maintain this price hike,, then the proper product market has been
defined; however, if consumers would switch to competing products, then
those substitutable products should also be included in the relevant
market.' 7 "A properly defined market excludes other potential
suppliers.., whose product is too different (product dimension of the
market) ....
The government also posits a provisional geographic market and
hypothesizes a SSNIP. If consumers would switch to suppliers in a
different market, then the provisional market should be expanded to
include these other sellers. The market has been properly defined when
the consumers would not look to other markets for the products in the
event of a SSNIP. Therefore, "[a] properly defined market excludes
other potential suppliers (i) whose product is... too far away (relevant
geographic market) ....
The Merger Guidelines combine these two markets and define the
relevant market as a collection of products or services sold in a
geographical region in which a hypothetical monopoly could successfully
be maintained (if firms were able to coordinate their actions or make use
of product differentiation)." Practical realities, such as public recognition
of the separate market or distinct customers, are used to apply the SSNIP
test; practical realities serve as an additional tool in defining a market
beyond the SSNIP test."
The Merger Guidelines recognize that in some markets the products
can be highly differentiated, "so that products sold by different
participants in the market are not perfect substitutes for one another.""2
Case law has taken a different and slightly more confusing approach to
these "submarkets." In United States v. Brown Shoe, the United States
Supreme Court expressly acknowledged the potential for relevant
submarkets in stating that a "broad market" can include relevant
submarkets that may be determined by examining practical indicia.23
Courts use the list of practical indicia as a way to add to the relevant
market definition;24 however, a submarket could be misleading and lead
17. Id. at i.o.

i.

United States v. Mercy Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968, 975 (N.D. Iowa 1995).

19. Id. at 976.

20. Id.
21. See generally FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. io66 (D.C. Cir. I997); United States v. Oracle
Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1o98 (N.D. Cal. 2004). An earlier use of submarket analysis appears in United
States v. Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. 294,325 (1962).
22. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note io, at 2.2. The Merger Guidelines recognize the varying
degrees of substitutability in the context of unilateral anticompetitive effects. Id.
23. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 325.
24. See Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1o75, IO78-8o. Practical indicia include "industry or public
recognition of the submarket as a separate economic entity, the product's peculiar characteristics and
uses, unique production facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, and
specialized vendors." Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 325.
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to overstating the competitive danger by excluding some effective
substitutes. Courts may find that some suppliers are doing business in a
sufficiently distinct way to constitute a separate product market within
the larger market.25
C.

EFFECT OF THE MERGER GUIDELINES ON CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS

The Merger Guidelines' market definition procedures bind the FTC
and DOJ and have proved highly influential on circuit court judges,
because the Supreme Court has not decided a merger case since the
1970S.2 Circuit and district court judges have embraced the Merger
Guidelines' method of defining a relevant market. Most recently, in
United States v. Oracle Corp., Chief Judge Walker, of the Northern
District of California, looked past consumer testimony expressing a
preference for the higher functioning of products in the narrow market
propounded by the DOJ and asked instead "what [the consumer would]
do in the event of an anticompetitive price increase by a post-merger
Oracle,"27 much like the Merger Guidelines suggest. However, while
circuit and district courts are embracing the Guidelines, they have been
cautious by citing both the Merger Guidelines and case law to support
decisions because it is not clear if the United States Supreme Court will
validate the Merger Guidelines completely. For example, Chief Judge
Walker in Oracle found that the DOJ failed to prove that the "postmerger Oracle would have sufficient market shares in the product and
geographic markets, properly defined, to apply the burden shifting
presumptions of Philadelphia National Bank;" and that the DOJ failed to
show that the HHI was increased enough to trigger a presumption of
illegality under the Merger Guidelines.B Until the Supreme Court
endorses the Merger Guidelines we can expect courts to look to both
case law and the Merger Guidelines to support decisions and follow the
procedures laid out in the Guidelines for defining the relevant market.
II.
A.

HISTORY OF CASINO MERGERS

KERKORIAN'S ROLE IN CASINO HISTORY

Although the back-to-back announcements seem surprising, the
25.

Id.

26. GAVIL, supra note i i, at 455.
27. United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d io98, 1131 (N.D. Cal. 2004). The court went on
to find that "that these witnesses did not establish that it was more likely than not that customers of a
post-merger Oracle would have no choice but to submit to a small but significant nontransitory price
increase by the merged entity." Id. at 1132. Thus, Chief Judge Walker rejected the government's
narrowly defined product market, in favor of a market that would include these substitutes. While this
is only a district court opinion, it will likely prove very influential in subsequent merger cases because
it was a highly visible case in a rapidly evolving industry and the opinion was well written and provides
detailed guidance on how to conduct a merger analysis.

28. Id. at i Io8.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vo1. 57:235

history of the casino industry is wrought with consolidations that have set
the stage for the current Monopoly game-like buying and selling of hotel
properties on the Strip. Kirk Kerkorian, currently a majority owner of
MGM Mirage shares, has been a major player in the history of Vegas
deals. He acquired the Flamingo in 1967, and built what is today the Las
Vegas Hilton in 1969, then sold both properties to Hilton Hotels in
1970.29

Kerkorian built four hotels that were the largest in the world in their
time, and in 1969 he got approval from the SEC to offer stock to the
public for his International Leisure Company at a time when the Justice
Department was attempting to clean up the casino industry and Wall
Street was unreceptive to gaming." Kerkorian built the MGM Grand,
and then sold it and a second Reno casino property to Bally
Manufacturing Corporation in 1986 for $594 million.3
Kerkorian was also behind the buyout of Steve Wynn's Mirage only
five years ago.32 In the 2000 deal worth $6.4 billion, MGM acquired prime
strip resorts like the Bellagio, the Mirage, Treasure Island, the Golden
Nugget (which MGM has recently resold), and a one-half interest in Las
Vegas' Monte Carlo and another casino in Mississippi.33 This deal gave
Kerkorian control of i6,6oo rooms on the Las Vegas Strip and further
narrowed the group of gaming competitors controlling the Strip.34
B.

MERGER APPROVAL UNDER THE HART-ScoTr-RODINO ACT

What all of Kerkorian's past deals have in common is that they all
flew through FTC approvals. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, passed in 1977,
requires that mergers worth more than $50 million be reported to the
government prior to consummation.33 After this initial report, most
mergers are cleared without further review. The government makes a
second request for more information in only approximately four percent
of the mergers reported. 6 This means that in 2002 only forty-nine second
requests were made by the FTC and DOJ, and this fell to only thirty-nine

29. Richard N. Velotta, Kerkorian Strikes Again, LAS VEGAS SUN, June 7, 2004, available at

http://www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/gaming/2004/jun/o7/5169786i i.html.
30. Hubble Smith & Rod Smith, Gaming Industry: Tale of Two Companies, LAS VEGAS REV.-J.,
June 6, 2004, at Ei, available at http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvr-home/2004/Jun-o6-Sun-2004/
business/24o44172.html.
31. Id.
32. Velotta, supra note 29.
33. Id.
34. Kate O'Sullivan, Doubling Down, CFO MAG., Sept. I, 2004, available at http://www.cfo.com/
printable/article.cfm/3126497?f=options.
35. Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 15 U.S.C. § i8a (2005). The Act exempts from reporting
requirements the acquisition of a hotel, but excludes from such exemption the acquisition of a hotel
that includes a gambling facility. 16 C.F.R. § 802.2 (2005).
36. William J. Baer et al., Taking Stock: Recent Trends in U.S. Merger Enforcement, ANTrrRUST,
Spring 2004, at 15, i6.
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requests in 2003."7 Generally, the second request is made when the
government is not comfortable with letting the transaction proceed as is
because they have reservations about the competitive effects of the
proposed merger." As such, the government requests information from
the merging companies, such as how they set prices, and generally works
with the companies to reduce the competitive concerns.39 The second
request phase could delay the merger for months. The second request
also sends off warning bells for the companies because the government
carefully identifies mergers that they will likely challenge before making
the second request. This is evidenced by the fact that nearly fifty percent
of mergers subject to a second request are eventually challenged in an
enforcement action.40 Enforcement actions can be concluded amicably by
consent decrees, where the merging companies agree to sell off assets to
third parties before the deal proceeds, or nonamicably by federal court
injunctions against the merger.4'
C.

HARRAH'S RECENT MERGERS

While Kerkorian has flown under the radar of the FTC, some of
Harrah's seven recent mergers have not fared as well.4" In 1998 Harrah's
acquired Showboat in a $1.2 billion deal, which included an off-Strip
Showboat casino that it later resold, as well as casinos in Atlantic City,
New Jersey; East Chicago, Indiana; and Sydney, Australia.43 Just one
year later Harrah's acquired the off-Strip Rio casino and the Players
International facility without regulatory issue.' However, in 2001
Harrah's announced a $650 million deal with Harvey's Casino Resorts
involving four properties in Nevada, Iowa and Colorado that raised
eyebrows at the FTC.45 The FTC stalled the deal when it required more
information about the Tahoe, Nevada properties. Ultimately the FTC let
the deal go through despite the fact that as a result Harrah's would
control forty-two percent of the available rooms in Lake Tahoe gaming
facilities. 46 In 2002 Harrah's acquired Louisiana Downs without obstacles.
37. Id.
38. Rod Smith, Federal Trade Commission Query: MGM-Mandalay Merger Hits Snag, LAS VEGAS
REV.-J., July 28, 2004, at Di, available at http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj-home/2004/Jul-28-Wed2oo4IbusineSS/24404249.html.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Julie Whitehead, Mega Casino Merger Pending, DELTA BUS. J. ONLINE, Jan.

2005,

http://www.deltabusinessjoumal.com/2oo5-Archives/oI -January/casinos.php.
43. Rod Smith, Mergers and Acquisitions: Boat Sale to Harrah'sOfficial, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Sept.
12, 2003, at Di, available at http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj-home/2003/Sep-I2-Fri-2003/business/
22139833.html.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Jaret Seiberg, States Zero in on Harrah's-Caesars,MICHAEL POLLOCK'S GAMING OBSERVER,
July 28, 2004, http://www.gamingobserver.com/news..july282oo4.html.
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But in 2003 the FTC had reservations about the anticompetitive effects
of Harrah's $1.4 billion merger with Horseshoe Gaming Holding Corp.
and once again made a second request.4 7 Analysts assumed that the FTC
was questioning market control in Illinois and Louisiana, but after
Harrah's sold off one property in Louisiana, the FTC allowed the third
largest casino merger in history to proceed after only a seven-month
delay. 48
D.

THE CURRENT DEALS

Although the FTC has yet to challenge any casino industry merger in
court, never before have deals this big been announced in such close
proximity to one another.49 In June 2004, MGM-Mirage announced plans
to acquire Mandalay in a $7.9 billion merger." MGM-Mirage was already
operating twelve casinos in Nevada, Michigan and Mississippi, while
Mandalay was in control of five Las Vegas Strip properties.' After the
merger was completed the combined company controlled thirty-seven
thousand hotel rooms on the Las Vegas Strip." Less than one month
later, Harrah's and Caesars announced that they had come to a $9.4
billion agreement under which Harrah's would take over Caesars
Entertainment's twenty-eight properties in five countries.53 Harrah's
currently operates twenty-six properties in thirteen states, and if the
merger gains approval, Harrah's will control the largest casino empire in
the world, with over fifty holdings and $8.8 billion in annual revenue.54

E.

JOINT CONSIDERATION OF THE DEALS

In the past, the FTC has considered the combined effects of pairs of
megadeals announced in close proximity to one another. In the i98os,
the FTC considered a pair of proposed mergers in the soft-drink industry

47. Smith, FTC,supra note 3.
48. Id. As a result of this merger, Harrah's controlled two of four casinos in the Chicago area and
five casinos in the Louisiana and Mississippi region. Id.
49. In addition to the aforementioned deals, the FTC permitted the following mergers to go
through without second requests: Boyd Gaming and Coast Casinos (a combination of seventeen
properties throughout the United States for $1.3 billion); a 1999 deal where Park Place Entertainment
acquired Caesars World and Grand Casinos for an unprecedented $3 billion; and the Station Casinos'
purchase of two off-Strip properties in 2ooi. See generally Starwood Sells Caesars World, Inc to Park
Place Entertainmentfor $3.0 Billion, HOTEL ONLINE, Apr. 27, 1999, http://www.hotel-online.com/News/
PressReleasesi99_2nd/Apr99_ParkPlaceCaesars.html; Boyd Gaming and Coast Casinos to Merger in
$1.3 Billion Transaction, CASINO NEWS, Feb. 9, 2004, http://www.americancasinoguide.com/News/2-904-boyd-coast.shtml. The current deals would put eighty percent of the rooms on the Vegas Strip in
the control of the two newly merged companies. O'Sullivan, supra note 34.
50. Smith, The MGM, supra note 2.
51. Dave Schwartz, Merger Update, CASINO [irz], June 15, 2004, http://www.unlv.edu/centers/
gaming/2004/07/merger-update-heres-great-capsule.html.
52. Smith, The MGM, supra note 2.
53. Id.
54. Schwartz, supra note 51.
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jointly.5 On the heels of Coca-Cola proposing to buy Dr. Pepper, Pepsi
announced its intent to acquire 7-Up. Insiders speculated that the second
deal was made in response to the first in order to maintain market share
6
and in the hopes that if one deal was killed, they would
both be. This
,
ploy was successful when the FTC halted both deals. Also in the i98os,
two pharmaceutical giants announced that they would be purchasing two
of their closest competitors in separate mergers. 7 The two companies
decided to have their two separate FTC cases tried in the same court
proceeding, likely because neither wanted the other acquisition to
proceed if their own could not." The court enjoined both mergers.59
The FTC has precedent to consider the deals jointly, but it did not
probably because very different regional markets were involved and the
antitrust concerns for the two deals were distinct. There is no doubt that
the FTC would still have given both deals close scrutiny had they been
announced individually, given the size of the deals and the recent
consolidation within the industry. However, having two megadeals
announced so closely together considerably raised the level of scrutiny as
more interests were at stake and the number of competitors was twice
reduced."
F.

THE ULTIMATE APPROVAL OF THE

MGM

MIRAGE-MANDALAY AND THE

HARRAH'S-CAESARS DEALS

If Harrah's had intended to disrupt the MGM Mirage-Mandalay
merger by forcing joint consideration, it was unsuccessful because on
February 16, 2005 the FTC approved the MGM Mirage-Mandalay
merger without imposing any conditions on the deal." This deal puts
nearly half of the rooms on the Strip under the control of the joined
company and gives 6them forty-four percent of the table games and forty
percent of the slots. ,
While the MGM Mirage-Mandalay deal cleared the FTC hurdle,
questions still remained about the Harrah's-Caesars deal because it was a
more complex deal with overlapping properties in more geographic
markets. 6' To alleviate antitrust concerns, the two gaming giants went on
55. Liz Benston, Casino Merger Approved by Boards, LAS VEGAS SUN, July 14, 2004, available at

http://www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/gaming/oo4/julIi4/517174140.html.
56. Id. The FTC permitted the later merger of previous targets, 7-Up and Dr. Pepper. Id.
57. See generally FTC v. Cardinal Health Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.C. 1998).
58. Benston, supra note 55.
59. CardinalHealth, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 67.
6o. Liz Benston, Harrah's, Caesars Ink Deal, Las Vegas Sun, June 15, 2004, available at
http://www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/gaming/2oo4/jul/I5/517178126.html.
61. See Abstracts, WALL ST. J.,Feb. 17, 2005, at Aio. MGM is already in the process of selling off
a Detroit casino in order to comply with Michigan law that allows only one gaming license to be held
in the Detroit area.
62. Benston, supra note 5563. Id.
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a rampage of casino sales. Harrah's avoided a potential obstacle in New
Jersey by selling off the Atlantic Hilton, leaving them with four casinos.
With Donald Trump's ownership of four casinos in Atlantic City as
precedent, this will likely clear the state regulatory hurdle in that
geographic area. 64 Harrah's also announced in September 2005 that it
would be selling properties in Michigan, where state regulations allow
only one gaming license in Detroit, and also that both Hariah's and
Caesars would each sell one property in Mississippi. 6' Caesars aimed to
appease the Nevada Gaming Commission with its sales of the Reno
Hilton and Caesars Tahoe. After sorting through what would be left of
the merged companies after these sales were completed, the FTC
approved the deal on June 8, 2005 followed by approval from the Nevada
gaming commission only two days later.
Whatever effect these historic mergers have on the face of gaming,
antitrust specialists will speculate what the FTC considered in deciding as
it did. While the FTC did not release a statement, the following
precedents were likely considered before these decisions were reached in
the MGM Mirage-Mandalay and Harrah's-Caesars deals.
III.
A.

CASES TURNING ON MARKET DEFINITION

CLUSTER MARKETS

Defining the market for goods under the Merger Guidelines seems
to be easy-we start with a physical product and see what the potential
substitutes are; but in terms of services this becomes more complexshould all the services of the firm be linked together and what are they
actually providing? In its premier merger case, Philadelphia National
Bank, the Supreme Court recognized that "the cluster of products
(various kinds of credit) and services (such as checking accounts and
trust administration) denoted by the term 'commercial bank'...
composes a distinct line of commerce."6 Because these groups of
products and services do not face competition from other financial
institutions, the Court reasoned, they are a unique market. 6 The Court
again recognized a cluster of services and products three years later in
United States v. Grinnell Corp., stating that services should be grouped
together if "companies recognize that to compete effectively, they must
offer all or nearly all types of services." ' This idea that groups of
products and services should be "lumped" together can be seen in many
cases and could be useful in lumping together the many products and

6465.
66.
67.
68.

See Schwartz, supra note 51; Whitehead, supra note 42.
Whitehead, supra note 42.
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321,356 (1963).
Id.at 356-57.
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 572 (1966).
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9
services of large casinos.6

B.

SOPHISTICATED RELEVANT GEOGRAPHIC MARKET DEFINITIONS

Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. has been
criticized as an unsophisticated definition of the relevant market. "The
jury found that the relevant product market was '[dlownhill skiing at
destination ski resorts,' and that the 'Aspen area' was a relevant
geographic submarket."'7 This definition fails to consider rather obvious
factors such as competing leisure activities or nearby ski resorts. It fails
to consider submarkets of advanced, thrill-seeking skiers who would look
beyond the "Aspen area" for a "destination ski resort." Subsequent cases
have sought more mature definitions of the relevant market and would
not accept such a haphazard definition. For example, in FTC v. Freeman
Hospital,the District Court rejected the FTC's definition of a geographic
market because it relied on where residents actually went, rather than
where they could practically go for hospital services.7" In defining the
geographic market for the gaming mergers, the FTC had to consider
where consumers can practically turn for alternatives and where the
gaming giants were facing legitimate competition.
i. Submarkets
FTC v. Staples72 and FTC v. CardinalHealth73 are two recent cases
that have sought to define a product market by grouping together
products to create a unique submarket.
a. Staples
In Staples, the FTC halted Staples' acquisition of Office Depot,
another leading office supply superstore chain.74 The District Court
rejected Staples' proposed product market of "overall sale of office
products," agreeing with the FTC that the relevant product market was
"consumable office supplies [sold] through office superstores."75 In
defining this submarket within the broader product market involving the
sale of consumable office products through all distribution methods (i.e.
mass merchandisers such as Wal-Mart, or warehouse club stores), the
District Court employed the Brown Shoe practical indicia.76 The Staples
69. See, e.g., FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. io66 (D.C. Cir. 1997); FTC v. Cardinal Health,
12 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
70. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 596 n.2o (1985). Although
not a merger case, the relevant market had to be defined for a monopolization case under section 2 of
the Sherman Act in order to find monopoly power.
71. FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 265 (8th Cir. 1995).
Inc.,

72. Staples, 970 F. Supp. at Io66.
73. CardinalHealth, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 34.
74. Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1070.
75. Id. at 1073-74.

76. Id. at 1075. Defining a relevant product market is usually necessary, but not if there is direct
evidence of anticompetitive effects; in this case the FTC had direct evidence of effects through pricing
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court found that "evidence shows that office superstores are, in fact, very
different in appearance, physical size, format.., and the type of
customers targeted and served [differ from] other sellers of office
supplies."' 77 The court also examined whether there was public or private
recognition of the submarket, or whether there was evidence "that
Staples and Office Depot each consider the other superstores as [their]
primary competition" in deciding that the office supply superstore was a
"well-defined submarket" within a broader market, that should
constitute its own product market for antitrust purposes. 78 The services
(such as printing, email marketing, trademark services, and prospect
lists) necessary to attract the desired customers were grouped together
with consumable office supply products to form a unique submarket
within the broader product market.
b. CardinalHealth
The government simultaneously challenged two different mergers of
prescription drug wholesalers that had been proposed in close succession
in the pharmaceutical industry in CardinalHealth.79 The defendants were
Fortune 500 companies whose principal business was the nationwide
distribution of prescription drugs to the local dispensers (such as chain
pharmacies, hospitals and nursing homes). The FTC presented evidence
that, in addition to delivery of pharmaceuticals, the defendant
wholesalers provided value-added services, such as sophisticated
ordering options, advanced inventory management systems, marketing
and advertising programs, and software to assist with manufacturer
bidding."' The court found that many of the wholesalers' customers (i.e.,
the local dispensers) would not be able to replicate these value-added
services that they had come to rely on, or obtain them from any other
source or supplier if the merged firms were to increase prices; therefore
other forms of distribution, principally direct delivery from the
manufacturer to local dispenser or customer, were not "reasonably
interchangeable" and thus should not be included in the wholesale
submarket 8 Again, the court used the practical indicia laid out in Brown
Shoe to reinforce this submarket by finding that internal documents show
that the wholesalers did not view other forms of distribution to be viable
substitutes." The District Court recognized a $54 billion submarket of
wholesale drug distributors within the broader $94 billion market
evidence, but nevertheless defined the relevant market because the courts have grown accustomed to
this procedure.
77. Id. at lo78.
78. Id.
79. FrC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 43-44 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
8o. Id. at 4. Manufacturer bidding is the process through which manufacturers compete to
provide dispensers with certain prescriptions.
81. Id. at 49.
82. Id.
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encompassing the delivery of prescription drugs by all forms of
distribution. 3
The idea of submarkets is helpful in an analysis of the casino
industry because the services provided by casinos are distinct from other
vacation resorts and other leisure activities.
2.
Hospital Mergers
Parallels can be drawn between mergers in the health care industry
and the gaming industry-although the "near presumptive illegality" ' 4 of
hospital mergers is not likely to be reflected in the casino context. The
government has been particularly successful at challenging hospital
mergers in court and in obtaining consent decrees from countless
hospitals that announced plans to merge. Experts speculate that the
courts are concerned with the availability of reasonably priced health
care post-merger, and critics claim that hospital mergers in small
communities will always run afoul of the concentration benchmarks of
the Merger Guidelines."
Like the casino industry, there has been a rash of consolidation in
the health care industry. As such, hospitals have begun competing with
physician groups, stand-alone clinics and other competitors who provide
health care services on an outpatient basis, because before recent
technological advances some services were only available at hospitals on
an inpatient basis." Hospitals and casinos alike merge to increase market
share, use resources more efficiently, enhance purchasing power, and
acquire capital for increased borrowing leverage. However, unlike the
casino industry, which has a limited number of gambling destinations,
hospitals are dispersed throughout the country near population centers,
due to the emergency nature of some care and consumers' preference for
being hospitalized near families and homes, among other factors."
Typically, courts have grouped the services of hospitals into a
product market consisting of "acute care inpatient hospital services."
The FTC has defined this as "a common host of distinct services and
capabilities that are necessary to meet the medical, surgical, and other
needs of inpatients, e.g., operating rooms, anesthesia, intensive care
capabilities, 24-hour nursing care, lodging and pharmaceuticals."' 9 The
simple definition of hospital services as those services for which there is
83. Id.
84. See United States v. Mercy Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968, 976 (N.D. Iowa 1995).
85. Thomas L. Greaney, Night Landings on an Aircraft Carrier. Hospital Mergers and Antitrust
Law, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 191, 192 (i997).
86. See Dayna B. Matthew, Doing What Comes Naturally:Antitrust Law and HospitalMergers, 31
Hous. L. REV. 813,838 (i994).
1989).
87. See United States v. Rockford Mem'l Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1251, 1261-78 (N.D. Ill.
88. See FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 268 (8th Cir. 1995); Mercy Health, 902 F. Supp. at
976.
o
89. FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, i29 (W.D. Mich. 1996).
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no outpatient substitute may misrepresent the relevant product market.
Consumers may not demand all of these services as a package and the
services are not always complementary to one another.9' Hospitals may
offer less than the full cluster, or may offer services not properly
contained in the cluster. There is also the problem of defining the
relevant geographic market because people may be more willing to travel
further for more advanced care.9

Courts appear to be moving away from this simple cluster of hospital
services. For example, in FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., the court
accepted the FTC's product definition of two separate product market
clusters: a general acute care inpatient hospital services cluster market
and a primary care inpatient hospital services cluster market.9" This
division of the larger services cluster market makes it easier to define the
geographic market and better reflects market reality because it
recognizes the fact that people will travel farther for more advanced care.
Thus, the court in Butterworth Health was able to draw two geographic
markets: a larger geographic market for the more sophisticated services
and a smaller geographic market for the more basic services.93 A similar
division of cluster markets may apply in the casino context because
certain consumers may travel further distances for the higher stakes
uniquely provided by Vegas cardrooms.
A properly defined product market centers on goods or services that
the merged company would be able to exercise market power over,
thereby increasing the price or decreasing the supply of these particular
goods or services.94 The FTC will use these same goods or services to
calculate the market shares of the participating companies after the
relevant market has been properly defined. In previous hospital merger
cases, the FTC has used licensed beds, discharges and inpatient revenue
to calculate market share once the market has been properly identified.95
Market shares within the casino industry are frequently measured by
comparing hotel-room capacity and casino revenue. Given that a postmerger company could fix hotel-room rates and gambling odds, the FTC
likely focused on these factors as handy measurements for market share
and considered these measurements when defining the relevant market.

9o. Cf United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 327 (1963) (where banking services
are complements and often purchased as a package).
91. Freeman Hosp., 938 F.2d at 271.
92. Butterworth Health, 946 F. Supp. at 1290-91. This second product market includes less
complex services such as "childbirth, gynecology, pediatrics, general medicine and general surgical
services." Id. at 1291.
93. Id. at 1291-94.
94- See Martin Sikora, Casino Megadeals Face Arduous Antitrust Screens, MERGERS &
AcQuisITIONs:

THE DEALMAKER'S

J., Sept. 2004, at 4.

95. Butterworth Health, 946 F. Supp. at 1294.
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DEFINING THE RELEVANT MARKET FOR CASINO MERGERS

DEFINING A RELEVANT PRODUCT MARKET

The casino industry has evolved from small card rooms into a broad
based vacation business patronized by consumers of all ages, incomes
and interests. Today's casino is a destination resort, offering amenities
such as shopping districts, multiple restaurants, spas, and world-class
entertainers in addition to the slots and card tables upon which the
industry was raised. Each casino offers many services and products
resulting in a myriad of ways in which to slice the casino business into a
relevant product market.
I. Submarket Within the Marketfor Vacations
If casinos are simply part of a larger relevant market for vacations,
then these proposed transactions would lack any potential antitrust
significance. Visiting a casino is only one of many options available to
consumers taking a vacation (e.g., sightseeing, amusement parks, cruise
ship, etc.). However, the Supreme Court in Brown Shoe recognized that
"within [a] broad market, well-defined submarkets may exist which, in
themselves, constitute product markets for antitrust purposes." Using
the practical indicia set out in Brown Shoe, it is much more likely that the
casino industry is a separate relevant product market within the larger
market for vacationers. Casino operators keep their primary focus on
other casino operators, for example fearing the rise of Indian gaming as a
serious competitive threat.97 The public recognizes the casino industry as
separate; casinos have distinct characteristics from other vacation
destinations (i.e., themed casino as compared to a regular hotel offering);
and casinos seek to attract a different type of consumer than many other
vacation alternatives." Likewise, if the foiling test of the Merger
Guidelines were applied, casino consumers are not likely to switch to
other forms of vacations in the event of a five to ten percent
nontransitory increase in price. Because these alternative forms of
vacations do not present suitable alternatives to a casino destination,
they should not be included in the relevant market. Thus, it seems clear
that casinos are a separate relevant product market in the larger market
for vacations. This definition begs the question of whether the products
(services and goods) offered by casinos may be broken down into smaller
relevant product markets (e.g., hotel rooms, slot machines, food and
beverage) or should be clustered together as a distinct cluster of services.
96. United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
97. See generally, Jennifer Nelson, Indian Casino Problem Moves to Urban Centers, S.F. GATE,
Aug. 20, 2004, available at http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/gate/archive/2oo4/o8/3o/
jnelson.DTL.
98. See

generally
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2.
Casinos: Clusters of Services?
Can the cluster of services provided by the MGM Mirage, Mandalay,
Caesars and Harrah's be measured as a distinct product market?
Products can be viewed as a cluster when firms selling only part of the
cluster will not compete as effectively because consumers prefer to
purchase the group of products from a single firm.' In the casino context,
the individual services appeal to the consumer, rather than the complete
cluster. For example, a tourist might play slots at Harrah's, have a room
at the MGM Mirage, catch a Celine Dion show at Caesars, and sip late
night cocktails at the swanky Mandalay Bay.I" Although many of the
gaming giants offer a similar array of products, they should not be
considered as a single cluster market because the consumer does not
view them as such. Consumers, at least to some degree, compare prices
on the individual products, and, thus competition is actually among the
individual providers of services, rather than the effectively tied group of
products.
The division of the cluster of services in the Butterworth hospital
case is also useful in the casino industry because it will allow regulators
to identify multiple product market clusters.'' This will better represent
the market reality that different consumers will be willing to travel
different distances to secure the distinctive services that casinos offer.
3. Relevant ProductMarkets
In defining the relevant product market, FTC attorneys likely
considered a range of alternatives when breaking down the groups of
typical casino offerings, including: entertainment, rooms, food and drink,
slots and tables. This reflects the resort-like nature of the casino
properties and the fact that gaming is one of many sources of revenue.
For example, gambling would account for only half of MGM's
anticipated post-merger revenues. 2 FTC regulators would have a nearly
insurmountable task of proving that casinos could exert market power
over the price of entertainment (such as concerts and boxing) or food
and drink given the alternatives available in any geographic market.
Because casino operators would be far more capable of exercising
market power over room rates and gambling odds, the relevant product
market clusters should be (i) Hotel Rooms in a Gaming Facility and (2)
Licensed Gaming Areas.

B.

DEFINING RELEVANT GEOGRAPHIC MARKETS

These mergers were ultimately contingent upon how broadly the

99. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 572 (1966).
ioo. See Whitehead, supra note 42.
ioi. See FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1285 (W.D. Mich. 1996).
iO2. Jerry Hirsh, Heavyweight Showdown, L.A. TIMES, July 16, 2004, at Ci.
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geographic market was defined. The FTC has a preference for defining
the relevant markets narrowly so that they can find higher market share
and thus a stronger inference of market power and potential for
anticompetitive effects. 3 To do this, the FTC could have advocated
multiple relevant geographic markets consisting of the cities in which the
merging companies would have properties: Las Vegas, Reno, Lake
Tahoe, Atlantic City, Detroit, New Orleans, etc.'0 4 However, if the FTC
were to challenge the merger in court, I think the court would likely
reject the geographic market definition. Defining the market as an
individual city would not recognize the fact that individual casino
properties compete with casinos in other cities within the same state, as
well as within the same region.
The merging parties could have advocated a worldwide relevant
geographic market, recognizing the' fact that even Strip operators
compete with worldwide gaming jurisdictions and travel destinations for
high-income and sophisticated consumers.' 5 In fact, the MGM Mirage
anticipates opening properties in both China and the United Kingdom as
gambling laws are being liberalized all over the world. ' 06
The relevant geographic market for Hotel Rooms in Gaming
Facilities and Licensed Gaming Areas should fall somewhere in between
these two extreme definitions. The Supreme Court looks at the "market
area in which the seller operates, and to which the purchaser can
practicably turn for supplies."'" So while many gaming giants may be
worldwide operators, the vast majority of consumers cannot turn to
international casinos as substitutes. Defining the relevant market as the
city in which a certain property is located is too narrow, and does not
recognize the fact that casinos in both New Jersey and Nevada face
pressures from casinos in neighboring states.' °s
For example, in New Jersey, where one-third of the market comes
from nearby Philadelphia, sixty-one thousand Pennsylvania slots
threaten Atlantic City's total revenue, seventy-five percent of which
comes from slots.'" Many of these slots will be placed in racetracks that
do not offer lodging and thus do not compete with Atlantic City's Hotel
Rooms in Gaming Facilities Cluster. However, the relevant geographic
market for the Licensed Gaming Areas Cluster may be much larger
because of these racetracks. Indian tribes operating casinos with resortlike hotels in Connecticut are rapidly expanding, which indicates that the
103. GAVIL, supra note II, at 463.
104. See O'Sullivan, supra note 34.

1O5. MGM Mirage-MandalayMerger Update,Bus. WIRE, Jan. 26, 2005.
io6. Nevada Approves deal between MGM Mirage, Mandalay, PROVIDENCE J., Feb. 27, 2005, at M3.
lO7. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961).

io8. Sikora, supra note 94.
to9. Id.
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FI'C should draw a much broader relevant geographic market in the
Northeast for the Hotel Rooms in Gaming Facilities Cluster. If the
market were confined to Atlantic City, and a merged Harrah's-Caesars
were to impose a five percent price increase or change the odds,
Northeasterners would have a host of other options for gaming
opportunities. Further, because Connecticut Indian casinos are
reasonably interchangeable with Atlantic City casinos, they should be
included in the relevant geographic market.
Likewise, casinos in Nevada face serious competition from
California's Indian tribe casinos, which have won the exclusive right to
operate Las Vegas-style casinos in the neighboring state. ' Consumers
who venture to Vegas, Reno, and Lake Tahoe by car and bus can easily
turn to California's Indian casinos for an alternative in the Hotel Rooms
in Gaming Facilities Cluster and the Licensed Gaming Areas Cluster if
all merged Las Vegas casino companies were to raise rates on rooms or
change gambling odds."' The MGM Mirage, Harrah's and Caesars have
recognized the threat of Indian casinos to the Nevada market and have
negotiated management contracts with several of the Indian tribes. As
Wally Barr, former CEO of Caesars, stated, "If I'm going to lose revenue
to California, I might as well go and get my share and bring it to
Nevada."....
The relevant geographic market may be drawn more narrowly in
those regional markets in which there is no competition from casinos in
adjoining areas. However, state laws and property spin-offs in these
markets have made any potential FTC challenges futile. State laws in
Michigan and Indiana that cap the number of gaming licenses an
individual casino operator can hold have alleviated antitrust concerns by
ensuring that concentration levels will not rise to a level sufficient to
worry the FTC."3 In Tunica, Mississippi, where Harrah's-Caesars would
have controlled roughly forty-five percent of the Hotel Rooms in
Gaming Facilities Cluster, the companies have each agreed
to sell off a
4
casino property to reduce potential antitrust concerns."
C.

SUBGROUP OF CONSUMERS WITH UNIQUE DEMANDS

There is an argument that the FTC should recognize a subgroup of
consumers with unique demands that make them more vulnerable to
exercises of market power. There is a difference between low-rollers who
iiO. MGM Mirage Signs Indian Casino Deal, LAS VEGAS SUN, Sept. 12, 2002, available at
http://www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/archives/2002/sep/12/o9I2ioo26.html?mgm+mirage.
i i i. See Sikora, supra note 94.
112. See generally Nelson, supranote 97.
113. Seiberg, supra note 46. Indiana law limits two licenses to one company, while Michigan law
limits one license to one firm. Id.
114. See id.; Adam Goldman, Harrah's,Caesars Begin Process, VENTURA COUNTY STAR, Aug. 31,
2004, at I i.
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make lots of small bets, mostly at slots, and high-rollers who are willing
to drop over $I million at the table of their favorite casino properties.
Recognizing this unique group of consumers makes it possible to draw a
different geographic market because high-rollers will travel longer
distances to play at the tables of the Mecca of high-stakes gambling-Las
Vegas. In fact, the number of people arriving by air to Las Vegas has
been on the rise, and certainly many of these visitors are high-rollers." 5
These high-rollers would not substitute nearby California Indian
casinos in the event of a price rise because the experience at a Vegas
high-stakes room is unique, as are the "comps..". Although many lowrolling slot machine players would be satisfied by visiting an Indian
casino on a daytrip, high-stakes gamblers will be satisfied with nothing
less than the posh hotel rooms of the casinos concentrated within a few
square miles on the Las Vegas Strip, or the licensed gaming facilities that
"comp" them to make wagers at high-stakes tables. If the FTC had
looked closely at this geographic market of Las Vegas for the product
market of high-stakes tables, they could have found levels of significant
concentration as the two newly combined companies would control over
two-thirds of the Strip's seventy-two thousand rooms available to visiting
gamblers." 7
CONCLUSION

The FTC has a lot to consider in defining the relevant market for
casino mergers, and not a lot of guidance in the case law. To properly
define the relevant market, the FTC must recognize that other vacation
alternatives should not be included in the relevant product market, and
the FTC must also reject the notion of a relevant product market
consisting of the total cluster of traditional casino services. Instead, the
FTC should examine the smaller product market clusters of Hotel
Rooms in Licensed Gaming Facilities and Licensed Gaming Areas. The
FTC likely realized that casinos face competition in many regions and in
various product markets because it ultimately approved the deals nearly

115. Chris Woodyard, Kerkorian Takes Casino Crown, USA

TODAY,

June 17, 2004, at IB (stating

that the number of people arriving by air to Las Vegas has increased fifteen percent in the first four
months of 2004, as compared with the same period the year before). While these figures do not
represent the arrival of only high-rollers, it is indicative of the fact that people are willing to travel
further to visit Las Vegas, and some percentage of these people will be traveling further to play Las
Vegas table games.
ti6. "Comps" is the abbreviation for "complimentaries." The comps that a gambler receives are
based on the play at the casino's tables. For example, for small wagers the casino might throw in free
drinks, but for high-rollers who make million dollar wagers, comps can include free limo service, a
luxury hotel suite and even airfare.
117. O'Sullivan, supra note 34. While the total number of hotel rooms in gaming facilities shows
high concentration in the Las Vegas area, the FTC would likely look at luxury suites as a measure of
market share, because high-rollers would likely only stay in luxury suites of casinos with high-stakes
tables.
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a year after they were announced. However the FTC defined the
relevant market in these mergers, one thing is certain, this is not the last
round of merger consolidation that the casino industry will "gamble on."

